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      ABSTRACT 
 
I start with some famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) Ludwig Wittgenstein because Pinker 
shares with most people (due to the default settings of our evolved innate psychology) certain prejudices 
about the functioning of the mind and because Wittgenstein offers unique and profound insights into the 
workings of language, thought and reality (which he viewed as more or less coextensive) not found 
anywhere else. The last quote is the only reference Pinker makes to Wittgenstein in this volume, which is 
most unfortunate considering that he was one of the most brilliant and original analysts of language. 
 
In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully summarizes the book with an 
overview of how the mind (language, thought, intentional psychology) –a product of blind selfishness, 
moderated only slightly by automated altruism for close relatives carrying copies of our genes--works 
automatically, but tries to end on an upbeat note by giving us hope that we can nevertheless employ its 
vast capabilities to cooperate and make the world a decent place to live. 
 
Pinker is certainly aware of but says little about the fact that far more about our psychology is left out than 
included. Among windows into human nature that are left out or given minimal attention are math and 
geometry, music and sounds, images, events and causality, ontology (classes of things), dispositions 
(believing, thinking, judging, intending etc.) and the rest of intentional psychology of action, 
neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual states (e.g, satori and enlightenment, brain stimulation and 
recording, brain damage and behavioral deficits and disorders, games and sports, decision theory (incl. 
game theory and behavioral economics), animal behavior (very little language but a billion years of shared 
genetics). Many books have been written about each of these areas of intentional psychology. The data in 
this book are descriptions, not explanations that show why our brains do it this way or how it is done. How 
do we know to use the sentences in their various way (i.e., know all their meanings)? This is evolutionary 
psychology that operates at a more basic level –the level where Wittgenstein is most active. And there is 
scant attention to context. 
 
Nevertheless this is a classic work and with these cautions is still well worth reading. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems 
view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-
book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 
367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book  
Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016  662p 
(2016). 
 
 
 
 
“If God looked into our minds he would not be able to see there whom we were thinking of.” 
 
“Ought the word “infinite” to be avoided in mathematics?  Yes: where it appears to confer a meaning 
upon the calculus; instead of getting one from it.” RFM revised edition (1978) p141 
 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and set it in relief—but it can’t 
be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself in the very fact that language can and only does 
refer to it. For since language only derives the way in which it means, its meaning, from the world, no 
language is conceivable that does not represent this world.”  Wittgenstein Philosophical Remarks S47 
 
“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” TLP 
 
I start with these famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) because 
Pinker shares with most people (due to the default settings of our evolved innate psychology) certain 
prejudices about the functioning of the mind and because Wittgenstein offers unique and profound 
insights into the workings of language, thought and reality (which he viewed as more or less coextensive) 
not found anywhere else. The last quote is the only reference Pinker makes to Wittgenstein in this 
volume, which is most unfortunate considering that he was one of the most brilliant and original analysts 
of language. 
 
Another famous Wittgensteinian dictum is “Nothing is Hidden.” If one dips into his work sufficiently, I 
think he makes it very clear what this means—that our psychology is in front of us all the time if we only 
open our eyes to see it and that no amount of scientific work is going to make it clearer (in fact it just gets 
more and more obscure). This is not antirational or antiscientific but it just states what he sees as the 
facts—a soccer game is out on the field –not in our head--and we understand perfectly well the 
motivations, anxieties, stresses and disappointments of the players and what effort is required to play and 
how the ball moves when kicked. Immense advances have been made in sports physiology, anatomy, 
bioenergetics, physics math and chemistry. Whole books full of equations have been written about how 
balls move thru the air and muscles apply force to move bones; about how muscle movements originate in 
part of the cortex, are mirrored in the brains of others; mountains of literature on motivation, personality, 
brain function and modeling. Has this given us any more insight into a soccer game or changed our 
experience of playing or watching? 
 
Intentionality (rationality) has been evolved piecemeal from whatever tools (genes) animals had to work 
with and so is full of paradoxes and illusions. Just as we see mirages in the desert or read words into 
sentences that are not there, and see animated blobs on a screen “causing” others to move and 
“helping” or “hindering”’, we look for thinking and believing in the head and confuse our innate 
psychological axioms with 
empirical facts (e.g., regarding math and geometry as things we “discover” in the world, rather than 
invent). 
 
In order for the concept and word “reality” to apply to the results we get from the use of differential 
equations, MRI scanners and particle colliders to a greater degree than or in place of apples, rocks and 
thunderstorms, it would be necessary for these recent discoveries to have had the same role in natural 
selection over hundreds of millions of years. It is only survival advantage over eons that selected the 
genes enabling our distant (invertebrate) ancestors to begin reacting in useful ways to the sights and 
sounds of the world and ever so slowly to produce brains that could form concepts (thoughts) that 
eventually were verbalized.  Science and culture cannot replace or take preference over our ancient 
intentional psychology but merely slightly extends or supplements it. But when philosophizing (or doing 
linguistics!) we are easily misled as context is missing and our psychology automatically dissects every 
situation for the causes and the ultimate or lowest level of explanation and we substitute that for the 
gross higher levels because there is nothing in our language rules to prevent it. It comes ever so naturally 
to say we don’t think—our brain does and tables are not solid because physics tells us they are made of 
molecules. But W reminded us that our concepts of, and words for, thinking, believing and other 
dispositions are public actions, not processes in the brain, and in what sense are molecules solid?  Hence, 
the quote above, which bears repeating, since I see it as one of the most fundamental ideas we have to 
get clear about before we can make any progress in the study of behavior. 
 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and set it in relief—but it can’t 
be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself in the very fact that language can and only does 
refer to it. For since language only derives the way in which it means, its meaning, from the world, no 
language is conceivable that does not represent this world.” 
 
Much of W’s writing is examples of the common sense knowledge that is essential to the success of all 
animal behavior and by and large not only the behavioral science but even AI, which cannot succeed 
without it, has been unable to grasp and implement it. Even one of the fathers of AI, Marvin Minsky said 
(in a 2003 Boston Univ. speech) that “AI has been brain dead since the 70’s” and lacked common sense 
reasoning. But his recent book “The Emotion Machine” still shows no awareness of the work that W did 
75 years ago, and this means no awareness of the contextual, intentional, point of view without which 
one cannot hope to grasp how the mind (language) works. 
 
When talking about behavior (i.e., thought or language or action) it is a nearly universal mistake to regard 
the meaning of a word or sentence as attached to it, ignoring the infinite subtleties of context, and thus 
we go astray. Of course, we cannot include everything about context, as that would make discussion 
difficult, even impossible, but there is a vast difference between regarding meaning as something that can 
be fully given by a dictionary entry and meaning as shorthand for a family of complex uses. Even Klein’s 
classic book ‘Time in Language’ (not cited by Pinker) regards the ‘time’ as a family of 
loosely connected uses, though of course he too has no awareness of W, Searle or intentionality. 
 
The point of mentioning this is that Pinker shares the reductionistic biases of most modern scientists 
and that this colors his approach to behavior in ways that will not be obvious to most readers. As 
fascinating as his data are and as masterful as his writing is, it subtly leads us to what I think is a 
mistaken picture of our psychology—a view that is due to the innate biases of our evolved psychology 
and hence is a universal failing. 
 
Pinker is the Richard Dawkins of psychology—one of the major popularizers of science in modern times. 
Possibly only the late and most unlamented (he was a self serving egomaniac who misled millions with his 
specious reasoning and blank slateism ) Stephan Gould sold more volumes of pop sci. It was Pinker’s 
masterful refutation of the universal delusion that human nature is culturally generated (one of Gould’s 
many delusions) that made his previous book ‘The Blank Slate’ a classic and a top choice for most 
important books of the 21
st 
century. Incidentally, there are many put-downs of Gould, including some by 
Pinker and Dawkins (“he has made tilting at windmills into his own personal art form” –as I recall it from a 
Dawkins review of a Gould tome from the Journal ‘Evolution’ a decade or so ago), but I think the best is 
that of Tooby and Cosmides in a letter to the NY Times (search their page or the Times). All of these works 
are intimately connected by the subject of animal behavior, evolutionary psychology, and of course ‘The 
Stuff of Thought”. 
 
Following convention, Pinker discusses Putnam’s famous , but badly flawed, twin earth thought 
experiment (bizarre thought expts. in philosophy were essentially invented by Wittgenstein), which claims 
to show that meaning is not in the head, but it was W in the 30’s—i.e., 40 years earlier-- who showed 
decisively that all the dispositions or inclinations (as he called them, though philosophers, lacking 
acquaintance with his work commonly call them by the incorrect name of propositional attitudes) 
including meaning, intending, thinking, believing, judging etc. function as descriptions of our actions and 
not as terms for mental phenomena. They cannot be in the head for the same reason a soccer game 
cannot be in the head. Later in life Putnam began to take Wittgenstein seriously and changed his tune 
accordingly. 
 
He makes almost no reference to the large and fascinating literature on behavioral automatisms (i.e., 
most of our behavior !--see e.g., “Experiments With People’(2004) or Bargh’s ‘Social Psychology and the 
Unconscious’ (2007) for the older work, and the now (2016) vast and rapidly expanding literature on 
implicit cognition), which shows that the more you look, the clearer it becomes that actions which we 
regard as results of our conscious choice are not. People shown pictures or reading stories of old people 
tend to walk out of the building slower than when give those of young people etc. etc. The well-known 
placebo effect is a variant where the info is consciously input—e.g., in a 2008 study eighty-five percent of 
volunteers who thought they were getting a $2.50 sugar pill said they felt less pain after taking it, 
compared with a 61 percent control group. Such effects can be induced subliminally if the price info is 
input via images, text or sound. Presumably the same is true of most of our choices. 
This brings us to one of my major gripes about this book—it’s monomaniacal obsession with the 
“meaning” of words rather than their use-- a distinction made famous by W in his lectures and some 20 
books beginning in the 1930’s. Like W’s insistence that we do not explain behavior (or the rest of nature ) 
but only describe it, this may seem like a pointless quibble, but, as usual, I have found as I reflected on 
these matters over the years that W was right on the mark. He said that a formula which will work most 
of the time is that the meaning of a word (far better to say a sentence) is its use in language—and this 
means its public use in a specified context to communicate info from one person to another (and 
sometimes to another higher mammal—dogs share a major portion of our intentional psychology). I 
mention this partly because in a previous book Pinker accused W of denying that animals have 
consciousness (an extraordinary view that is actually defended by some) because he noted that a dog 
can’t think “perhaps it will rain tomorrow”, but W’s point was the unexceptional one that there are many 
thoughts that we cannot have without language and that we have no test for interpreting a dog’s 
behavior as showing that it expected something tomorrow. Even if it used an umbrella and invariably got 
it out of the closet the day before a rain, there is no way to connect this to it’s mental state—same for a 
deaf mute who could not read or write or use sign language. This connects to his famous demonstrations 
of the impossibility of a private language and to the fact that dispositions are not in the head. W showed 
how the absence of any public test means that even the dog and the mute cannot know what they are 
thinking—nor can we, because disposition are public acts and the act is the criterion for what we 
thought—even for ourself.  This is the point of the quote above—neither God nor neurophysiologists can 
see thoughts, beliefs, images, hopes in our brain because they these are terms for acts and neither the 
vague and fleeting epiphenomena we experience nor the correlates detectable by brain studies function 
in our life in the same way as do the contextual use of the sentences describing these acts. And, regarding 
animal consciousness, W noted that intentional psychology gets a foothold even in a fly—a point 
marvelously and increasingly supported by modern genetics which shows that many genes and processes 
fundamental to primate behavior got their start at least as early as nematodes (i.e., C. elegans) some 
billion years ago. 
 
Intentional psychology or intentionality (very roughly our personality or rationality or higher order 
thought (HOT) is a very old philosophical concept that (unknown to most) was given its modern 
formulation by Wittgenstein, who, in the 20,000 pages of his nachlass, now mostly translated and 
published in some 20 books and several CDROM’s, laid the foundations for the modern study of human 
behavior. Sadly, he was mostly a recluse who did not publish for the last 30 years of his life, never really 
finished writing anything of his later work and wrote his brilliant and highly original comments on 
behavior in a style various termed epigrammatic, telegraphic, oracular, Socratic, obscure etc. and all 
published posthumously over a period of more than 50 years (the famous Philosophical Investigations 
(PI) in 1953 and the most recent-but not the last!—The Big Typescript in 2005) and thus, though he was 
recently voted one of the top 5 philosophers of all time, and Philosophical Investigations  the most 
important philosophy book of the 20
th
 
century, he is ignored or misunderstood by nearly everyone. The 
feeling I often get is that our psychology is a coral reef with most people snorkeling on the surface 
admiring the bumps while Wittgenstein is 20 meters below probing the crevices with scuba gear and 
flashlight. 
 
Wittgenstein’s literary executors were stuffy academics and his books issued mostly from Blackwell with 
staid academic titles and no explanation whatsoever that they can be seen as a major foundation for the 
modern study of evolutionary psychology, personality, rationality, language, consciousness, politics, 
theology, literature, anthropology, sociology, law etc., –in fact everything that we say, think and do since, as 
he showed, it all depends on the innate axioms of our evolved psychology which we share to a large extent 
with dogs and to some extent even with flies and C. elegans. Had his works been presented with flashy 
covers by popular presses with titles like How the Mind Works, The Language Instinct, and The Stuff of 
Thought, much of the intellectual landscape of the 20
th
 
century might have been different. As it is, though he 
is the major subject of at least 200 books and 10,000 papers and discussed in countless thousands more 
(including Pinker’s How the Mind Works), based on the hundreds of articles and dozens of books I have read 
in the last few years, I would say there are less than a dozen people who really grasp the significance of his 
work, as I present it in this and my other reviews.  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of 
behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
One result of all this (what one philosopher has called “the collective amnesia regarding Wittgenstein”) is 
that students of language including Pinker take Grice’s notions such as implicature  (which seems just a 
fancy word for implication) and, more recently, relevance theory, as a framework for “the relation 
between words and meaning” (of course W would turn in his grave at this phrase since how can they be 
separable from their use if one follows his meaning is use formula?) but they seem to me feeble 
substitutes for intentionality as described by W and revised and enlarged by Searle and others.  In any 
case, Grice is the normal soporific academic, Sperber (a leader in relevance theory) tolerable, Pinker 
engaging and often elegant and even poignant, Searle (see esp. ‘Rationality in Action’) is clear, rigorous, 
and quite original (though owing, I think, a very big debt to W) but too academic for the bestseller lists, 
while Wittgenstein, once you grasp that he is a natural master psychologist describing how the mind 
works, is very demanding, but brilliantly original and often breathtaking. Pinker writes masterful prose 
while Wittgenstein writes telegrams, though often moving and poetic ones and on a few occasions he 
wrote beautiful essays. Pinker can be mined for some gold, lots of iron and some dross while W is mostly 
gold, a little iron and hardly a speck of dross.  Pinker is mostly summarizing the work of others (though in 
impeccable style) while W is so original and so bizarre he’s way over most people’s heads. I suggest 
reading Pinker, Searle and Wittgenstein alternately or simultaneously with a dash of Sperber, Grice and a 
few hundred others from time to time. 
 
W said that the problem is not to find the answer, but to recognize that which is always before us as the 
answer. That is, our language is (by and large) our thought, which is about actual or potential events 
(including actions by agents such as barking, speaking and writing), and that meaning, contra Pinker and 
a cast of thousands, is use and nothing is hidden (i.e., language is (mostly) thought). 
 
The ignorance in many quarters is so complete that even an otherwise marvelous recent 358 page book 
by Wiese on a topic virtually created by Wittgenstein (Numbers, 
Language and the Human Mind—which I see is cited by Pinker) there is not a single reference to him! 
 
W mostly emphasizes the different uses of the “same” words” (i.e., a splitter) who originally wanted to 
use the quote “I’ll teach you differences!” as the motto of his book PhilosophicaI Investigations. That is, 
by describing the different uses of sentences (the language games), and by modifying the games in 
thought experiments, we remind ourselves of the different roles these games play in life and we see the 
limits of our psychology. But Pinker, again following the seductive defaults of our evolved modules and 
the egregious examples of thousands of others, is a lumper who often blurs these differences. E.G., he 
speaks repeatedly of “reality” as though it was a single thing (rather than a whole family of uses).  He also 
speaks of reality as something separate from our experience (i.e., the classic idealist/realist confusion).  
But what test is there for reality?  He slips (as do we all) so easily into the reductionistic substitution of 
lower levels for higher ones so we are all inclined to dismiss the thinking that we can see (i.e., actions) for 
processes in the brain, which our language (thought) can not possibly be describing, as it evolved long 
before anyone had any idea of brain functions. If Pinker imagines that you are not really reading this page 
( e.g., your retina is being hit with photons bouncing off ink molecules etc.) then I respectfully suggest he 
needs to reflect further on the issue of language, thought and reality and I know of no better antidote to 
this toxic meme than immersion in Wittgenstein. 
 
Reflecting on Wittgenstein brings to mind a comment attributed to Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. 
Broad (who did not understand nor like him) which ran something like ‘Not offering the chair of 
philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!” I think of 
Wittgenstein as the Einstein of intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching 
ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of the world and like 
Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult 
personality who published only one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but 
became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing more, 
and knowledge of his new work in mostly garbled form diffused slowly from occasional lectures and 
students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings 
in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear relationship to sentences 
before or after; that these were cut and pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in 
the margins, underlinings and crossed out words so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his 
literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling with 
the monstrous task of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel 
views of how the universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing slowness (not 
finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it was about; that 
he became as much notorious as famous due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake 
and even nonsense and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens 
of thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work in which 
he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and 
condensed form that it was impossible to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually forgotten 
and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics had 
only passing and usually erroneous references to him and that many omitted him entirely; that to this day, 
half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who really grasped the monumental 
consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
It seems crushingly obvious that our evolved psychology has been selected to match the world to the 
maximal extent compatible with our genetic and energetic resources and that is ALL we can say about 
reality, and we ALL understand this (we LIVE it) but when we stop to think about it, the defaults of our 
universal psychology take over and we start to use the words (concepts) of “reality,” “aspects,” “time,” 
“space,”, “possible,” etc. out of the intentional contexts in which they evolved. The following gem comes 
from biologists (I take it from Shettleworth’s  superb but neglected book Cognition, Evolution and 
Behavior). 
 
“The role of psychology then is to describe the innate features of the minds of different organisms which 
have evolved to match certain aspects of that physical external universe, and the way in which the 
physical universe interacts with the mind to produce the phenomenal world. “ 
O’Keefe and Nadel “The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map” 
 
Think of it this way—you can look up a word in the dictionary but you cannot look up a use there, unless 
there was a video which showed before and after the event and all relevant facts about it. The 
dictionary is like a morgue full of dead bodies. Here lies “rose” and here “run” and here “in” and here 
“is” and what is missing is life. Add a photo and it’s a little better: add a video and lots better: add a long 
3D color hires video with sound and smell and its getting there. 
 
Part of Wittgenstein’s description of our public psychology included many detailed examples of how the 
sensations and images in my mind don’t carry any epistemic weight even for me. How do I know I am 
eating an apple? My taste and vision might be wrong and how to decide? But if I talk about it or write it 
down and you say “that’s a tasty looking apple” etc. I have an objective test.  Right and wrong get a 
foothold here. 
 
W was going to use a quote from Goethe as the motto of PI --“In the beginning was the deed.” That is, 
evolutionarily it was perceptions and actions and then memories of them and then thoughts about them 
and then words voicing the thoughts. So, the event is the thing Australopithecus thought about and 
natural selection for being able to make acoustic blasts which substituted for them was strong enough to 
modify our vocal apparatus and suitable control circuitry at a fantastic pace, so by early Neanderthal 
time they were talking a blue streak and have not shut up mind or mouth for more than a few minutes 
since. W understood, as few have, the primacy of actions and the irrelevance of our thoughts, feelings 
etc. as the foundations of communication, which is why he is often 
called a behaviorist (i.e., Dennett, Hofstadter, B.F. Skinner style denial of the reality of our mental life, 
mind, consciousness etc.) but this is patently absurd. 
 
It reminds me of the famous description of Plato of the shadows on the cave wall vs turning around to 
see people actually using language—an analogy that I never thought of in regard to W and which I was 
stunned to see a few hours later in Pinker’s last chapter. In any case if one considers carefully any case of 
language use we see that much of our intentional psychology is called into play. 
 
One can see the ignorance of Wittgenstein in the articles in EEL2 (the Elsevier Encyclopedia of Language 
and Linguistics-2nd ed. (2005) 12,353p- yes that’s 12 thousand pages in 14 vols and a mere $6000 ) 
which is by far the biggest, and one hopes the most authoritative, reference in language studies. 
Curiously, Pinker does not have a single reference to it, but you can find it, along with nearly all of 
Pinker, Searle, Wittgenstein and thousands of others free on the net. 
 
To get a grasp of the basic necessities for AI you might e.g., find it much more interesting to read W’s RFM 
than Minsky’s ‘The Emotion Machine’. Pinker has referred to Brown’s famous list of hundreds of 
universals of human behavior, but these are nearly all gross higher level behaviors such as the possession 
of religion, reciprocal altruisms etc. but it large omits hundreds of other universals which underlie these. 
Wittgenstein was the first, and in some cases perhaps the only one to date, to point out many of the more 
fundamental ones. However he did not tell you what he was doing and nobody else has either so you will 
have to puzzle it out for yourself. Most people read first (and often nothing else) his Philosophical 
Investigations but I prefer the more strictly mathematical examples in his Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics. If you read with the understanding that he is describing the universal axioms of our 
evolutionary psychology which underlie all our reasoning then his work makes perfect sense and is 
breathtaking in its ingenuity. 
 
Pinker illustrates how the mind works with the Barbecue Sauce example. There are of course a limitless 
number of others which illustrate our subjective probability (often called Bayesian reasoning—though he 
does not mention this). My favorites are Doomsday (see e.g., Bostrum’s book or web page), Sleeping 
Beauty and Newcomb’s problem. Unlike Barbecue, which has a clear solution, many others have 
(depending on your viewpoint) one, none or many. We may regard these as interesting, as they show 
gaps in or limits to our rationality (a major theme in Wittgenstein) or (what we have known at least since 
de Finetti’s work in the 20’s) that all probability is subjective, or like the famous liar paradox or Godel’s 
theorems (see my review of Hofstadter’s ‘I am a Strange Loop), as trivial demonstrations of the limits of 
our primate mind, though Pinker does not expand on this issue nor give more than a few hints at the vast 
literature on decision theory, game theory, behavioral economics, Bayesianism etc. 
 
EEL2 does have a passable short article on W which avoids making too many glaring errors, but it totally 
misses nearly everything of importance, which, if really understood, would make the article by far the 
longest one in the book. Nearly the whole thing is 
wasted on the Tractatus, which everyone knows he totally rejected later and which is extremely confused 
and confusing as well. Hardly anything on his later philosophy and not a word about the two searchable 
CDROM’s which are now the starting point for all W scholars (and anyone interested in human behavior) 
which are now becoming widely disseminate via the net. There is also nothing here nor in the articles 
about Chomsky, innate ideas , evolution of syntax, evolution of semantics, evolution of pragmatics 
(practically every one of his 20,000 pages has to do with novel ideas and examples on these two), schema 
theory etc., nor about how he anticipated Chomsky in studying “depth grammar”, described the problem 
of underdetermination or combinatorial explosion nor a word about his discovery (repeatedly and in 
detail—e.g., RPP Vol. 2 p20) some 20 years before Wason of the reasons for “glitches” in “if p then q” 
types of constructions now analyzed by the Wason selection tests (one of the standard tools of EP 
research), nor about how his work can be seen as anticipating many ideas in evolutionary psychology, 
about his founding the modern study of intentionality, of dispositions as actions, of the epiphenomenality 
of our mental life and of the unity of language, math, geometry, music, art and games, nor even an 
explanation of what he meant by language games and grammar—two of his most frequently used terms.  
W made the change from trying to understand the mind as a logical, domain general structure to a 
psychological idiosyncratic domain specific one in the late 20’s but Kahneman got the Nobel for it in 2002, 
for numerous reasons, not the least of which is that they did lab work and statistical analysis (though W 
was a superb experimentalist and quite good at math). Of course one cannot fault the EEL2 too much as it 
merely follows the similar omissions and lack of understanding throughout the behavioral sciences.  And, I 
am not bringing this up in the way one might complain about the absence of info on ancient Chinese war 
rockets in a book on rocket engines, but because his work is still a virtually untapped mine of behavioral 
science diamonds, and, for my money, some of the most exhilarating and eye opening prose I have ever 
read. Nearly anything he has written could be used as a supplementary text or lab manual in any 
philosophy or psychology class and in much of law, mathematics, literature, behavioral economics, 
history, politics, anthropology, sociology and of course linguistics. Which brings us back to Pinker. 
 
In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully summarizes the book with 
an overview of how the mind (language, thought, intentional psychology) – a product of blind selfishness, 
moderated only slightly by automated altruism for close relatives carrying copies of our genes--works 
automatically, but tries to end on an upbeat note by giving us hope that we can nevertheless employ its 
vast capabilities to cooperate and make the world a decent place to live. 
 
Pinker is certainly aware of but says little about the fact that far more about our psychology is left out 
than included. Among windows into human nature that are left out or given minimal attention are math 
and geometry, music and sounds, images, events and causality, ontology (classes of things), dispositions 
(believing, thinking, judging, intending etc.) and the rest of intentional psychology of action, 
neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual states (e.g., satori and enlightenment, brain stimulation and 
recording, brain damage and behavioral deficits and disorders, games and sports, decision 
theory (including game theory and behavioral economics), animal behavior (very little language but a 
billion years of shared genetics). Many books have been written about each of these areas of intentional 
psychology. The data in this book are descriptions, not explanations that show why our brains do it this 
way or how it is done. How do we know to use the sentences in their various ways (i.e., know all their 
meanings)? This is evolutionary psychology that operates at a more basic level –the level where 
Wittgenstein is most active.  And there is scant attention to context. 
 
Among the countless books not referred to here are Guerino Mazzola’s excellent tome investigating the 
similarity of math and music ‘The Topos of Music’, Shulgin’s amazing work probing the mind with 
psychochemicals  ‘Phikal’ and ‘Tikal’. Many which try to represent mental functions with geometrical or 
mathematical means such as Rott ‘Belief Revision’ Gardenfors various books, and of course the massive 
efforts going in logic (e.g. the 20 or so Vol Handbook of Philosophical Logic) as well as many others edited 
or written by the amazing Dov Gabbay (e.g., ‘Temporal Logic’). Re spatial language of the numerous 
volumes on the psychology, language or philosophy of space, the recent ‘Handbook of Spatial Logic’ 
(especially fun are Chap 11 on space-time and the last Chap. by Varzi) stands out. The point is that these 
logical, geometrical and mathematical works are extensions of our innate axiomatic psychology and so 
they show in their equations and graphics something about the ‘shape’ or ‘form’ or ‘function’ of our 
thoughts (modules, templates, inference engines) and so also the shape of those of animals and even 
perhaps of computers (though one has to think of what test would be relevant here!). And of course all 
the works of Wittgenstein, keeping mind that he is sometimes talking about the most basic prelinguistic 
or even premammalian levels of thought and perception. Of course many books on AI, robot navigation 
and image processing are relevant as they must mimic our psychology.  Face recognition is one of our 
most striking abilities (though even crustaceans can do it) and the best recent work I know is ‘Handbook 
of Face Recognition’. Of the numerous books on space/time one can start with Klein’s ‘Language and 
Time’ or McLure’s ‘The Philosophy of Time’. Smith’s ‘Language and Time’, Hawley’s ‘How Things Persist’ 
and Sider’s ‘Four- Dimensionalism’ , Ludlow’s ‘Semantics, Tense and Time’ , Dainton’s ‘Time and 
Space’.and ‘Unity of Consciousness’, Diek’s ‘The Ontology of Spacetime’ and Sattig’s ‘The Language and 
Reality of Time”.  But as one would expect and as detailed by Rupert Read, the language games here are 
all tangled up and most the discussions of time are hopelessly incoherent. 
 
And also a good but now dated book covering much of relevance with articles by Searle and others 
is Vanderveken’s  ‘Logic, Thought and Action’. 
 
